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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
union cannot then demand this additional information. Its right has
been waived.
Many developments are occurring in labor law concerning the
duty to bargain in good faith. In the instant case, there is further
extension of the duty to bargain in post contractual relations where
there is a grievance-arbitration clause. Furthermore, there is an
expansion of the employer's duty to provide information to the
union so that it now includes the granting of access to company
property for union conducted time studies. Consequently, the
trend toward a wider duty to bargain continues apace, with this
case marking its latest step.
Edward Perry Johnson
Labor Relations-Employer's Duty to Bargain
Over Subcontracting--Waiver
One type of maintenance work at Allied Chemical involved
scheduled repairs, such as machine improvement and minor con-
struction. In the past this work had been performed both by
company employees and outside contractors. During negotiations
leading to the collective bargaining agreement, the union attempted
to secure a commitment from the employer which would have
restricted the company's right to unilaterally subcontract this type
of work. After full discussion of the issue, the union consented to a
contract which did not include the restriction. Two months after
the collective bargaining agreement was signed by the parties, the
union requested the employer to notify and bargain with it
respecting the company's decisions to subcontract this type of
maintenance work. The company refused to notify the union before
the work was subcontracted. No employees in the maintenance
department were laid off or discharged as a result of the em-
ployer's unilateral subcontracting. The union filed a section
8(a) (5)' charge with the National Labor Relations Board.
I "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees...-" Labor Management
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The Board concluded that there was no evidence of a significant
impact on the employees from which it could find that the em-
ployer, by unilaterally deciding to subcontract, violated its duty to
bargain. The charges were dismissed. Held, affirmed. In deter-
mining whether the employer has violated his statutory duty to
bargain about "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment," the Board and the courts must examine the impact
on the employees resulting from the unilateral decision to sub-
contract. Here the Board was entitled to conclude that there was no
substantial adverse impact on the employees caused by the em-
ployer's unilateral decisions to subcontract. District 50, UMW,
Local 13942 v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1966).
The issue of subcontracting is becoming increasingly important
to both management and labor. To the employer subcontracting
represents a feasible method of operation to reduce expenses and
increase profits. However, from the employee's point of view,
subcontracting is to be feared. It threatens a loss of jobs and the
destruction of the bargaining unit itself. In considering this subject
the initial issue is to determine whether subcontracting is a statu-
tory subject to collective bargaining under Section 8(d)2 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.
A current discussion of the problems involved in subcontracting
need only begin with the recent Supreme Court decision in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,' since all previous sub-
contracting cases must be considered in the light of this decision.
In Fibreboard the existing collective bargaining contract with the
union was about to expire. The union sought to negotiate a new
contract. The company unilaterally decided to contract out its
maintenance work and refused to negotiate with the union on this
subject thereby eliminating the maintenance employees. The
2 To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment . . . but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession . . . Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §
8(d), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
3379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision4 that the company's
failure to negotiate with the union concerning its decision to
subcontract was a refusal to bargain although the company's motive
was economic rather than anti-union. In reaching this conclusion,
the major concern was to determine the meaning of the words
"other terms and conditions of employment" in Section 8(d). Both
the Board and the Court relied on Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & No. W. Ry.6 and Teamsters v. Oliver' in reaching their
conclusion that the subcontracting in question was covered by
this phrase. The Supreme Court in Fibreboard stated:
that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the re-
placement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with
those of an independent contractor to do the same work under
similiar conditions of employment-is a statutory subject of
collective bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision need not and
does not encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "sub-
contracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.'
The true signifiance of this decision depends on the Board's
application of this doctrine to other cases. The Board soon recog-
nized that the principles of Fibreboard were not hard and fast rules
and that the permissibility of unilateral subcontracting would have
to be approached on a case-by-case basis.'
In one of the Board's first decisions after Fibreboard the employer
unilaterally subcontracted the rebuilding of a mining machine
formerly done by unit employees. However, all unit employees
continued to work full time and the Board found no section 8(a) (5)
4 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
5In Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962) the Board
established a duty to bargain over economically motivated aecisions to
subcontract, but in that case anti-union motives were also involved.
6362 U.S. 330 (1960).
7358 U.S. 283 (1959).
8 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
9 See, e.g., Allied Chemical Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 718 (1965); Superior
Coach Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 188 (1965); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Mans-




Southworth: Labor Relations--Employer's Duty to Bargain Over Subcontracting--
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967
CASE COMMENTS
violation since the employer's action resulted in no "significant detri-
ment" to the employees in the unit.'
Thus the Board hit upon the concept of "significant detriment"
which has been consistently followed by it" although sometimes
expressed as "significant impact"'" or other similiar phrases ap-
parently having the same basic meaning. This threshold concept of
detriment requires that the unilateral decision must have caused
substantial harm to the members of the bargaining unit. 3 With this
concept in mind, the next step is to determine what the Board con-
siders as substantial harm to the bargaining unit. This is an
illusive idea and it is regretable that the Board has not offered a
more definite criterion. In any event, the Board suggested in
Westinghouse Electric (Mansfield)'4 that where there had been
a section 8(a) (5) violation it appeared that the subcontracting
either (1) effected a change in the conditions of employment, or
(2) resulted in a significant impairment of job tenure, employment
security or reasonably anticipated work opportunities in the bar-
gaining unit."5
A good example of the difference in the two tests is demonstrated
by a decision in which the majority of the Board found no significant
detriment to the employees in the bargaining unit as there were
no layoffs and consequently no change in the terms and conditions
of employment. The majority held the possibility that employees,
who had been laid off two years earlier, would have been recalled
except for the subcontracting was too remote. The dissent, relying
on the "significant impairment of ... reasonably anticipated work
opportunities.. ." concluded that the laid off employees did suffer
a "significant detriment."'6
Of the two standards suggested, the change in condition of em-
ployment test, seems preferable since the Board does not have to
analyze the employee's expectations, but can make its deliberations
on more easily ascertainable criteria such as whether the managerial
decision itself caused a change in the working arrangements of
10 Kennecott Copper Corp., (Chino Mines Division), 148 N.L.R.B.
1653 (1964).
" See, e.g., American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. (Bettis), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1965).
12 See, e.g., Superior Coach Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 188 (1965).
1333 U. Cm. L. REv. 315, 318 (1966).
'4 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
15 Supra note 13.
16 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (Bettis), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1965).
4
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the firm, such as layoffs.'7 It would also give the employer a better
guide line for future decisions.' 8
It appears that the "reasonable anticipation" test has not been
followed and even when it was suggested in Westinghouse (Mans-
field)' the Board stated that the employer's duty to give a union
prior notice and an opportunity to bargain normally arises where
the employer proposes to take action which will effect some change
in existing employment terms or conditions within the range of
mandatory bargaining. To determine if a change occurred the
Board looked to past practice to determine what was the norm or
status quo and found that subcontracting was a recurrent event in
accord with the employer's usual method of doing business. It
concluded that the employer's unilateral action did not change the
terms and conditions of employment. The Board stated that there
was no demonstrable adverse impact on the employees in the unit
as there was no loss of jobs. If there has been a history of subcon-
tracting the Board has generally not found a refusal to bargain, but
this is often linked to the key factor that no "significant detriment"
occurred to the employees.20 The employer should continue to
argue that past history of subcontracting is a defense when sub-
contracting is the normal method of operation, but whether the
Board would take the same approach if there were a loss of jobs or
layoffs is questionable.2 ' For example, suppose the employer had
unilaterally subcontracted 100,000 dollars worth of work for five
years and yet because of good business conditions, no employees
were laid off. Then in the sixth year the employer subcontracts
100,000 dollars worth of work, but due to less work in the unit
20 per cent of the employees are laid off. While the subcontracting
is the status quo, the Board would probably find a violation since
the subcontracting the sixth year caused a significant detriment to
the bargaining unit.
' 1Supra note 13, at 320.
18 Ibid.
19150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
20 Mermin, The Impact of Darlington-Fibreboard, N.Y.U. 18th CONT. ON
LABOR 235, 247 (1966).
21 In Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964) the employer
had subcontracted for two years, but since there were layoffs the Board found
an unfair labor practice.
[Vol. 69
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While the Board has maintained that the Fibreboard doctrine
is not limited to employer subcontracting actions which result in
the permanent elimination of an entire department, unit or indivi-
dual jobs,22 the Board has consistently limited the doctrine to those
situations in which a significant detriment has occurred resulting
in an actual change in the employee's terms and conditions of em-
ployment. For example, the Board stated that even if it be assumed
that some loss of overtime did result from the subcontracting, it does
not appear that such loss had a substantial impact upon the unit
employee's terms and conditions of employment as no unit em-
ployee was laid off or lost his regular wage."
The principal case emphasizes the fact that there was no sub-
stantial impact on the bargaining unit since none of the em-
ployees were laid off or discharged. Therefore, ,it would appear from
the Board's decisions and the principal case that the employer's
unilateral subcontracting actions will not result in a section 8(a) (5)
violation as long as there is no actual change in employee conditions
such as layoffs or loss of jobs. It would also appear that if the
Board becomes involved in the "reasonable anticipation of work
opportunities" area, it will have gone beyond the Supreme Court's
decision in Fibreboard.
There is a major distinction between Fibreboard and the sub-
sequent Board decisions concerning subcontracting which may
give the employer a defense to unilateral subcontracting even when
there is a significant impact on the employees thereby creating a
statutory duty to bargain. This defense is waiver. In Fibreboard
the collective bargaining agreement had expired while in the prin-
cipal case, and the majority of the other Board decisions since
Fibreboard, there was an existing collective bargaining agreement
in existence at the time of the unilateral action by the employer.
In the principal case the union attempted during negotiations to
secure a ban against subcontracting, however, the union failed and
agreed to a collective bargaining contract which did not mention
subcontracting. This prompted the employer to argue that the
union had waived its right to bargain over subcontracting during the
term of the agreement. The trial examiner did not agree with this
22 American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965).
23 General Tube Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 850 (1965).
6
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contention, but the Board did not adopt the trial examiner's
conclusions in this area because it was unnecessary for the Board's
decision.
It is important to realize why this was unnecessary for the Board's
decision. The trial examiner found that the employer did have a
statutory duty to bargain over subcontracting and that the union
had a statutory right to bargain over subcontracting. With this
finding it then became necessary for the trial examiner to consider
the employer's defense of waiver to determine if the union did
waive its rights. However, when the Board reversed the trial
examiner and found no significant detriment to the employees and
therefore no statutory duty to bargain, it became unnecessary to
consider waiver.
To fully understand the concept behind waiver it is necessary
to consider the period immediately preceding the Taft-Hartley
Act.2" The Wagner Act2 had been judicially construed to mean that
the employer's duty to bargain continued throughout the term of
the agreement even with respect to those matters which were
agreed upon by the parties." However, this judically established
requirement was supposed to have been set aside by section 8(d) 7
of the present act. The interpretation of this section was presented
to the Board in Jacobs Mfg. Co. 8 where the union, during the
existence of the contract, requested bargaining over pensions and
group insurance. During pre-contract negotiations the matter of
group insurance had been discussed. The board split over this
question and finally found the employer guilty of a refusal to
bargain only on the issue of pensions which had not been discussed
in pre-contract negotiations. Thus a majority seemed to hold that
24 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).2- The National Labor Relations Act (popularly known as the Wagner
Act) 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 was approved on July 5, 1935. Twelve
years later this statute was amended and supplemented by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act) passed on
June 23, 1947, over President Truman's veto.
26 Seagle, The Duty of an Employer to Bargain in Postcontract Negotia-
tions, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 523, 524 (1966).
27 The duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party
to discuss or agree to any modifications of the terms and conditions con-
tained in a contract for a fixed period if such modification is to become
effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the
provisions of the contract. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
1964).
2894 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
[Vol. 69
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discussion of a bargainable issue in contract negotiations excused
subsequent bargaining on the issue during the term of the contract. 9
In NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co."° the court enforced the Board's
decision. In commenting on the Taft-Hartley exception to the
duty to bargain under section 8(d), the court said that the
"purpose of this provision is, apparently, to give stability to agree-
ment governing industrial relations. . . -"' But, section 8(d) does
not relieve "an employer of the duty to bargain as to subjects which
were neither discussed nor embodied in any of the terms and condi-
tions of the contract." 2 The court pointed out that it did not intend
to pass upon the effect on the duty to bargain that mere previous
discussion of a subject would have without putting it into the
contract.3
Regardless of what the majority of the Board seemed to hold in
Jacobs, the Board is now taking the view that to have a waiver it
must be shown that the union consciously yielded or clearly and
29 Supra note 26, at 526. In Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1231
(1951), member Reynolds basing his dissent on a study of the legislative
history of § 8(d), contended that:
Section 8(d) imposes no obligation on either party to a contract to
bargain on any matter during the term of the contract except as the
express provisions of the contract may demand. This is a result reasonably
compatible with the particular section 8(d) language involved as well
as with section 8(d) as a whole. Moreover, not only does the result
accord stability and dignity to collective bargaining agreements, but it
also gives substance to the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
Chairman Herzog, concurring in part:
True, that agreement is silent on the subject, so it cannot literally
be said that there is a term "contained in' the 1948 contract relating to
the group insurance program. The fact remains that during the
negotiations which preceded its execution, the issue was consciously
explored . . . In my opinion, it is only reasonable to assume that
rejection of the Union s basic proposal, coupled in this particular instance
with enhancement of the substantive benefits, constituted a part of the
contemporaneous "bargain" which the parties made when they negotiated
the entire 1948 contract. In the face of this record as to what the
parties discussed and did, I believe that it would be an abuse of this
Boards mandate to throw the weight of Government sanction behind
the Union's attempt to disturb in midterm, a bargain sealed when the
original agreement was reached.
To hold otherwise would encourage a labor organization - or, in a
section 8(b)(3) case, an employer - to come back, time without
number, during the term of a contract, to demand resumed discussion
of issues which, although perhaps not always incorporated in the
written agreement, the other party had every good reason to believe
were put at rest for a definite period. I do not think that the doctrine
of the Tide Water case was ever intended to go as far as to extend to
facts like these, or that it should be so extended....
30 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
31 Id. at 684.32 Ibid. (emphasis added.)33 Id. at 683, note 1.
8
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unmistakably waived its right." The Board also stated that to
adopt another view would be equating a collective bargaining
agreement to an ordinary contract and disregard the familiar con-
cept of collective bargaining as a continuing and developing process.
It would seem obvious that the amendment of section 8(d) by the
Taft-Hartley Act was to put some limit on the scope of collective
bargaining and the solution is not advanced by continuing to speak
of a "continuing and developing process" since it was this language
which produced the Taft-Hartley amendment."
The Board, however, has continued to maintain the position that
while a statutory right may be waived by collective bargaining, a
waiver, if it is to be found, must be clearly and unmistakably
established and it is not lightly to be inferred. 6 In one subcon-
tracting case the Board held that the fact the union tried to have
provisions written into the agreement which would have prevented
the employer from subcontracting did not constitute a waiver when
the union failed in its attempt to include such provisions."
While the present position of the Board is open to criticism, the
employer, if he is now going to argue waiver, is faced with the
difficulty of showing a "clear and unmistakable waiver." In trying
to show this the transcript of the pre-contract negotiations could
become extremely important. With the transcript the employer
should be able to show a clear waiver in a case where the union
gives up its ban on subcontracting as a quid pro quo for another con-
cession, such as a union security clause. 8 To hold that this would
34 Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 (1958):
It is well established Board precedent that, although a subject has been
discussed in pre-contract negotiations and has not been specifically
covered in the resulting contract, the employer violates section 8(a) (5) of
the Act if during the contract term he refuses to bargain, or takes
unilateral action with respect to the particular subject unless it can be
said from an evaluation of the prior negotiations that the matter was
"fully discussed" or "consciously explored" and the union "consciouslyyielded" or dearly and unmistakably waived its interest in the matter.
's Supra note 26.
36Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.B., 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963).
3 Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).3, York Miror, 151 N.LR.B. 834, 840 (1965). The Board stated
that, "ff it were to appear that after flil explanation of the subject duringprior negotiations the Union had consciously yielded their interest . . . in
return for the severance and termination rovisions, a finding of cear and
unmistakable waiver might well be justified, citing Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B.
283 (1964); Shell Chemical Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 298 (1964); Proctor Mfg.
Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1169 (1961).
[Vol. 69
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not be a waiver would place the employer at an unfair disadvantage
in that he conceded to one demand in exchange for the dropping of
another and during the term of the contract the union could again
demand bargaining concerning the "waived" demand. 9
The position taken by the Board concerning waiver since the
Taft-Hartly Act can be summarized into three interpretations:
(1) Member Reynolds" opinion in Jacobs Mfg. Co. that the
employer is not obligated to bargain over any matter during the
contract unless specifically provided for in the contract;4" (2) the
majority holding in Jacobs which indicated that mere discussion
during contract negotiations would constitute a waiver;4" (3)
the view expressed in Press Co.42 and also in part by Chairman
Herzog's opinion in Jacobs Mfg. Co. 3 that the union must have
consciously explored the matter and clearly waived it. While the
third view has been criticized, the Board in a recent subcontracting
case has indicated that it might move into a fourth position of
express contractual waiver.4
The Board, apparently ignoring the purpose of the Taft-Hartley
Act, stated that -
in the absence of a specific contract clause covering the matter
an employer is under a continuing duty to bargain on request
with respect to subcontracting affecting unit work, and there-
fore, must bargain with the union in good faith upon demands
as to such subcontracting even during the terms of an existing
agreement."
39 In Beacon Piece Dying & Finishing Co., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958),
the Board seemed to take the position tat waiver will not be found in the
common "give and take" bargaining situation. This case could be distinguished
on its facts since the employer completely refused to discuss the matter in
question.
40 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1231 (1951).
41 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
42 See note 34.
43 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1227 (1951).4 4 American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965).45 Id. at 422. It is interesting to note that the Board cites Westinghouse
Elec. (Mansfield), supra note 14, for this proposition while in Mansfield the
Board actually stated at page 1576: "Thus, it is wrong to assume that, in the
absence of an existing contractual waiver, it is a per se unfair labor prac-
tice .. " The Board further stated that the fact that the union on three
separate occasions sought contract language limiting subcontracting but each
time signed a contract without such limitation was a contributing factor to
their decision, especially since the union did win agreement for improved
benefits in employment security.
10
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This case is diametrically opposed to Member Reynolds' dissenting
opinion in Jacobs and it is also an extension of the previous board
positions.
Even with this extreme position, the employer should be able to
protect himself by the use of a coverage clause (or a termination
and modification clause). This type of clause should satisfy both
the clear and unmistakable waiver test and also the express con-
tractual requirement. In Jacobs,6 the Board stated that the
employer could protect himself with a coverage clause to the effect
that both parties waive bargaining over any issue not included in
the contract.
It would appear that a clause to this effect would be a "clear
and unmistakable waiver", however, the trial examiner in Westing-
house (Mansfield)4  held that a similar clause was not such a "clear
and unmistakable waiver" of a statutory right. The clause was
even stricter than the coverage clause approved by the Board in
Jacobs since the parties waived only matters discussed during
negotiations but not embodied in the contract.48 The Board in
Mansfield did not have to consider the trial examiner's conclusion
since it found no statutory duty to bargain. Even though the trial
examiner said it was not a waiver, it is difficult to see how the Board
could reach a conclusion that such a clause in the contract would
not be a "clear and unmistakable waiver." This type of clause
should also be distinguished from a wrap-up clause such as was
46 Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1220 (1951):
The parties acknowledge that during negotiations which resulted in this
agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands
and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law
from the area of collective bargaining, and that the understandings and
agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and
opportunity are set forth in this agreement. Therefore, the Corporation
and the Union, for the life of this agreement, each voluntarily and
unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be
obligated, to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter
not specifically referred to or covered in this agreement, even though
such subjects or matters may not have been within the knowledge or
contemplation of either or both the parties at the time that they
negotiated or signed this agreement.4 7 Westin house Elec. Corp., (Bettis), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1965).48 Id. at 1585:
The company and union each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the
right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain
collectively with respect to any subjects or matters not specifically referred
to or covered in [the contract] which were discussed during the
negotiations of [the contract].
[Vol. 69
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involved in New York Mirror49 which the Board found did not
constitute a waiver. This clause merely provided that the entire
contract was embodied in the written contract.
While a coverage clause could aid the employer in arguing
waiver, the waiver argument without this clause is certainly not
dead, although the Board has dealt it a grievous blow."0 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals"' recently stated that even if the
subcontracting in question had been held to be a subject of col-
lective bargaining, it was certainly arguable that the parties had
already bargained over the subject during contract negotiations.
For three previous contracts the union had tried to include a clause
which would have prevented subcontracting, but the final agree-
ment was always silent on the matter. The court by dicta indicated
that the waiver argument is still valid. However, in light of the
recent Board decisions, the management lawyer is going to have
to be extremely cautious in this area. In many situations it may
well be advisable to bargain over such matters.
It has also been argued that the union waived its right to bargain
over subcontracting by agreeing to a broad management prerogative
clause. It is argued by some that it is drawing too much meaning
from a management prerogative clause standing alone to say that
the union waived or bargained away its statutory right to collective
bargaining.
2
On the other hand, while the Board is reluctant to find waiver,
it has found such a waiver in some recent cases53 where along with
other factors there was a management rights clause. 4 Thus, a
properly drawn management prerogative clause is still important
although in a recent case the Board did not adopt the trial examin-
er's conclusion that the management rights clause constituted a
waiver." In any event, since it is not per se an unfair labor practice
49New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).50 Supra note 26, at 536.
51 NLRB v. Adams Dairy Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
5 2 Dunau, Subcontracting and Unilateral Employer Action, N.Y.U. 18th
Conf. on Labor 219, 232 (1966).
53 International Shoe Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 673 (1965); Ador Corp., 150
N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965); General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 396 (1964).
54 Supra note 20, at 246.
55 Fafinir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 332 (1965).
12
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to insist on such a clause,"6 the management lawyer should bargain
for as broad a prerogative clause as possible.
Louis Sweetland Southworth, II
Products Liability-Delegation of Duties by Manufacturers of
Inherently Dangerous Products
P, the purchaser and user of a hot water heater, manufactured
by D1, instituted an action against D1 and D9, the contractor who
installed the hot water heater, for the damages arising from its
explosion. When sold, the water heater was accompanied by
installation instructions which specified that a combination tempera-
ture and pressure valve must be used on the hot water line. These
instructions were not followed. The contractor instead followed
the common practice of the plumbing industry and installed only
pressure valves, resulting in the explosion. The lower court dis-
missed the suit as to Ds and found against D, and then both P and
D, appealed. Held, judgment against D1 reversed. The water
heater was not in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous
to the user when it left the manufacturer, and, in addition, the
water heater was substantially changed when used by P from the
condition in which it was sold. Because D2 failed to install the
correct temperature relief valve he was negligent and this negligence
became the sole proximate cause of the explosion. State Stove Mfg.
Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
This case raises a vital problem existing today in the field of pro-
duct liability, i.e., to what extent can a manufacturer delegate his
duty to preserve the safety of the consuming public through (1)
inspecting his product, (2) warning as to the safe use of his pro-
duct or (3) installing additional and necessary safety devices,
and by delegating this responsibility be relieved of liability, when
the product itself is inherently or imminently dangerous?'
56 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
1 For the purposes of this article it is assumed that privity of contract is
not a requirement for the manufacturer to be held liable. However, West
Virginia would still recog ne the manufacturer's liability since it supports the
exception of imminently dangerous products to the privity rule. General Motors
Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1943) and Peters v. Johnson, Jackson
& Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1901).
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